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It is hardly rocket science, achieve more by pooling and sharing 
resources that are already available within many different parts 
of a complex system. To put it into a perspective, maximum uti-
lization has been one of the mainstays of any production cycle 
since early days of organised human life. However, for two of the 
world premier security actors, this presents a daunting paradigm 
shift. Two ambitious initiatives – NATO’s Smart Defence (SD), and 
European Union’s Pooling and Sharing (P&S) now face same old 
issues that have kept European defence cooperation lagging be-
hind other policies for years. 
Europe’s persistent inability – to live up to its ambitions when it 
comes to projection of power abroad – has been much lamented 
before. Strategic “disablers” of EU’s defence are well known. First, 
policy it is supposed to grow from is not supranational; it is highly 
dependent on accommodation of diverse and often conflicting 
national interests. Second, a genuine leap forward in defence ca-
pabilities would come at a price exceeding many of members’ 
abilities, now more than ever. 
There are two factors now that make this strategic inability more obvious today than, for 
instance, ten or five years ago. First is the omnipresent economic crisis, whose effects on 
defence budgets have been deliberated extensively. Program cancellations, changed equip-
ment orders seem to be the order of the day. For the poorer EU members, any substantial 
investment in capabilities seems to remain unlikely for years to come. As Clara O’Donnell had 
said, “what we are seeing is basically cuts in capability and little thought on what to replace 
them with” (Bandow 2013). 
Since many of EU members are also present in NATO, two alliances share the same concern. 
Recently, NATO Secretary General said how “there is a lower limit” on how little can be spent 
on defence. The limit was supposedly set in 2006, when NATO members promised to devote 
at least 2% of their GDP to defence. Yet today the Europeans collectively spend no more than 
1.6% of GDP on defence, an astonishing one-third of America’s 4.8%. Furthermore, NATO 
members pledged to annually spend 20% of their military budgets on procurement (of new 
weapons and equipment). As of 2013, just five of twenty-eight NATO members actually do 
so (Ibid). It is quite clear that an approach shared by two organisations presents the way 
forward. 
Second factor is the on-going “Asia pivot” in Washington’s foreign policy. With the US turn-
ing to the Pacific, Europeans will be once again asked to do more. In this particular account, 
recent record has been anything but successful. Even in Africa, where the EU has accumulat-
ed significant experience in peacekeeping since it had inaugurated ESDP in 1999, the Union 
has remained “paralyzed […] unable to do more than offer rhetorical support to France and 
the individual member states that are chipping in with logistical assistance” (Whitney 2013). 
Mali is no exception – think of Chad or Congo before that. As much as it has contributed to 
operations being feasible, the “leading nation” principle has hurt burden sharing, still consid-
ered a cornerstone of future deployments.
Plus, leading nation can do little if it itself hasn’t got the right “tools”. What Americans un-
derstand as equipment “fundamental” for operations – “air-to-air refuelling tankers, cruise 
missiles and ships” (Coughlin 2013) – even the rich EU members are in short supply of. For 
instance, in Libya, these assets, known as “strategic enablers” had to be provided by the US 
up to a rate of 90% (Biscop 2012: 1). One might argue, therefore, that despite all the high 
level (verbal) commitments, no real progress in ensuring Europe’s defence autonomy has 
been made since the Kosovo War.
What is the relation between SD and P&S?
It was no surprise then when in December 2010 the EU launched the “Ghent Framework” for 
P&S of military capabilities. NATO followed EU’s suit just months later, when at the Munich 
Security Conference held in February 2011, its Secretary General announced the SD. Both 
more concepts then actual policies, they came from the same reasoning: do more with what 
is already available, “on the table”, or what is being planned (“on the shelf”, to keep with the 
analogy). Idea of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC), first put forward by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, was all about capacities – human (actual contribution to and deployment in a mul-
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tinational force) and material (to pool resources in the fields related to defence equipment 
acquisition, research, funding and utilisation). P&S came to be as no PSC was established. 
Instead of developing their own separate programmes, EU member countries promised to 
jointly seek cost-effective solutions. In that sense, SD was “very much a NATO reaction to the 
dynamic […] initially generated in the CSDP” (Biscop 2012: Ibid).
The EU has gone further by operationalizing P&S through European Defence Agency (EDA). 
For the EU member states, P&S is not only about cutting costs of maintaining and upgrading 
defence capabilities, but also undertaking new capability initiatives, which will address the 
very strategic enablers we have mentioned. P&S announces more significant European con-
tribution to NATO’s capabilities development, all with the goal to manage defence in “smart-
er” way (Ibid). Or, translated to the “language” NATO, and more specifically, US understands, 
“the aim is for the Europeans to pay for a European capacity […] allowing US capacity to be 
diverted elsewhere”. P&S may therefore be understood just as an aspect of SD, only very am-
bitious and highly complex – an expression of a desire to promote modern managerial prac-
tices in what is otherwise a slowly reforming sector. Ultimate goal desired by Brussels would 
be for Europe to achieve strategic autonomy, as we have previously said, a view shared by 
Sven Biscop; something EU has been searching for since the end of the Cold War.
Capability development through the CSDP and NATO is however “100% compatible” (Biscop 
2013: 5). These capabilities can be deployed in any given framework, be it UN, EU or NATO 
mandated (or led) operation. Apart from pooling and cooperation, both the P&S and SD 
comprise notions of prioritization – which capabilities are to be maintained in the first place 
– and specialization – referring to capabilities which should be provided through burden 
(role- or task-) sharing.
Writing in their 2012 analysis, Centre for European Policy Studies’ Giovanni Faleg and Ales-
sandro Giovannini have asked whether the EU’s defence market structure is really encour-
aging P&S. What these two researchers saw was a sector teeming with protectionism and 
diverging strategic interests, too strong to allow for openness and liberalisation. While they 
insisted how a “fully-fledged EU defence system and market remains unattainable due to 
political and strategic considerations”, Faleg and Giovannini claimed how “piecemeal prog-
ress is possible and viable”, especially if “boosted by a credible NATO call for ‘more Europe’” 
(Faleg and Giovannini 2012: 2). SD is therefore as political as any high level initiative can get. 
With the austerity measures really kicking in, verbal commitments appear hardly sufficient. 
So far, according to O’Donnell, “smart defence initiatives have saved less than 1% of spend-
ing cuts that were imposed since 2008” (Bandow 2013). Rasmussen’s call for “more” came 
as “some European states were essentially disarming” – all the European members except 
Britain, France and Germany account for just 7.5% of NATO’s expenditures (Bandow 2013). 
Reasons for this are several. Again according to Faleg and Giovannini, joint procurement 
projects can hardly resist the challenge posed by national rivalries. Also, with no EU Battle 
groups ever deployed, there is no tangible operational experience, or a corpus of lessons 
learned that could provide the necessary push. Finally, there is protectionism as there are 
geopolitical considerations. Pressure on national defence industry grows as it is presented 
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with a “triple challenge”, as Financial Times’ journalist understood SIPRI’s recent analysis: 
while fiscal austerity is shrinking home markets, they face more competition overseas and are 
shut out from the two fastest growing big markets – China, because of sanctions prohibiting 
military sales, and Russia since it strongly favours domestic production (Hoyos 2013). 
Whither smarter defence?
There are principal preconditions upon which operationalization of P&S – by now the most 
comprehensive of “smarter defence” initiatives – depends. First is the necessity to have Eu-
ropean defence market liberalised. That would lead to more competition among defence 
companies, removal of national barriers, and would further imply what Faleg and Giovannini 
have labelled “Europeanization” of part of the member states’ defence budget (Faleg and 
Giovannini 2012: 3). And finally, European autonomy calls for a platform for coordination be-
tween members of both alliances (Biscop 2013: 3); something that hasn’t really been thought 
through.
On a more practical note, for it to work, P&S should be preceded by coordination of de-
fence planning between countries (EU members) interested in deepening their cooperation 
(Valasek 2013; Sedivy 2013). For instance, Nordic countries, pioneers in many aspects of 
defence collaboration, went as far as seconding (exchanging) officers tasked with defence 
planning in each other’s respective ministries, thus easing the way for joint procurement. 
Second, partner countries should re-visit P&S projects they are involved in, and think hard 
of joining any of the other 30 or so which are on-going (Zaborowski 2013). Thirdly, again to 
Tomas Valasek’s opinion, any P&S effort agreed upon should be first “covered” by an inter-
national treaty, transforming it into an actual political commitment where progress could be 
reassessed every year.
One positive example is the cooperation centred on the Grippen fighter aircraft, flying under 
the flags of Sweden, Czech Republic and Hungary. These three EU members have managed 
to cut life cycle cost of the aircraft by sharing parts that are stored and used for replacement. 
For instance, it only takes a week to have a full engine replaced and aircraft back in operation. 
On the NATO side, again a case in point of sharing is the “strategic airlift capability”, where 
a particular resource in short supply – C 17 Globemaster III transport aircraft offered by the 
US – is shared by ten NATO-PfP countries. “Sharing” therefore can work.
However, for actual pooling to kick in, difficult issues of prioritization and specialization will 
need to be resolved first. This calls upon a real shift forward in thinking; countries giving up 
on national pride and stating how they will not produce equipment A or B, how they would 
rather specialize. This would in turn enable Europe to acquire the resources it needs in order 
to project its power abroad more efficiently, without constantly turning to the US for sup-
port. Given the EU record thus far, as P&S continues to be more about “sharing” than “pool-
ing”, such a scenario seems unlikely. 
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